

Dr. Evangelia Papadaki

Curriculum Vitae

2012

Evangelia Papadaki

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University of Crete
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RESEARCH INTERESTS

Moral philosophy, Bioethics, Feminist Philosophy

EDUCATION

2002 - 2006 University of Sheffield Sheffield, UK

Ph.D. in Philosophy: date of viva: 26 January 2007 (awarded with no corrections)

- **Thesis title:** "Sexual Objectification: From Kant to Contemporary Feminism"
- **Advisors:** Professor Jennifer Saul, Professor Leif Wenar

2000 - 2002 University of Sheffield Sheffield, UK

M.A. in Philosophy (Distinction)

- **M.A. dissertation:** "Positive and Negative Aspects of Treating People as Things"
- **Advisor:** Professor Jennifer Saul

1996 - 2000 University of Crete Rethymno, Greece

B.A. in Philosophy and Social Sciences (Distinction)

Graduated First in Class with Distinction

AWARDS AND HONOURS

- ELKE, Research Committee, University of Crete, Small scale focus research project funding, 2011
- Arts and Humanities Research Council (A.H.R.B.) award for doctoral study, 2002-2005
- Departmental Scholarship, Philosophy Department, University of Sheffield, 2002, 2005
- Arts and Humanities Research Council (A.H.R.B.) award for research-training year, 2001-2002
- Best graduating student award, National Scholarship Foundation, Greece (I.K.Y.), 2000
- National Scholarship Foundation, Greece (I.K.Y.), 1996-2000
- Best student award, National Scholarship Foundation, Greece (I.K.Y.), 1999

PUBLICATIONS

- ‘Sexual Objectification: From Kant to Contemporary Feminism’
Contemporary Political Theory, Vol. 6, Issue 3, August 2007.
- ‘Women’s Objectification and the Norm of Assumed Objectivity’ in
Episteme, Volume 5, Issue 2, 2008.
- ‘What is Objectification?’
Journal of Moral Philosophy, Volume 7, Number 1, 2010.
- ‘Feminist Perspectives on Objectification’
Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, Edward N. Zalta (ed.), Stanford University, March 2010 (substantive revision June 2011).
- ‘Kantian Marriage and Beyond: Why it Is Worth Thinking About Kant on Marriage’
Hypatia, Volume 25, Issue 2, 2010 (Published online: 2009).
- ‘Pornography: Is There a Connection between Treating Things as People and Treating People as Things?’
in *Sex, Drugs and Rock and Roll: Psychological, Legal and Cultural Examinations of Sex and Sexuality*, eds. Helen Gavin and Jacquelyn Bent, Interdisciplinary Press, 2010.
- ‘Abortion and Kant’s Formula of Humanity’, *Humana Mente: Journal of Philosophical Studies*, forthcoming in July 2012.
- ‘Understanding Objectification: Is There a Special Wrongness Involved in Treating Human Beings Instrumentally?’
Prolegomena: Journal of Philosophy, forthcoming.
- ‘Bodies, Persons, and Respect for Humanity: A Kantian look at the permissibility of organ commerce and donation’, under submission’
Under Review
- ‘Treating People Merely as Means’
Article in Progress

SELECTED TALKS

- ‘Treating People Merely as Means’
 - 7th Bioethics Retreat, Tsoutsouros Arkalochoriou, October 2011
- ‘Bodies, Persons and Respect for Humanity: A Kantian look at the permissibility of organ commerce and donation’
 - Applied Ethics Conference, Society for the Advancement of Philosophy and Center for Croatian

Studies of the University of Zagreb, June 2011

- 6th Bioethics Retreat, Plakias Rethymno, September 2010

▪ 'Kant on Sexual Objectification and Marriage'

5th Bioethics Retreat, Plakias Rethymno, September 2009

▪ 'Pornography: Is There a Connection between Treating Things as People and Treating People as Things?'

- Good Sex Bad Sex: Law, Crime, Ethics, Prague, May 2010

- School of Philosophy, Birkbeck College, University of London, March 2008.

▪ 'Kantian Marriage and Beyond: Why It Is Worth Thinking About Kant on Marriage'

Pacific Society for Women in Philosophy (P-SWIP), Sacramento State University, USA, October 2006.

▪ 'Kant on Sexuality and Marriage'

Department of Philosophy, University of Sheffield, February 2006.

▪ 'Kant on Sexual Objectification'

Workshop on Gender and Philosophy (WOGAP), M.I.T., USA, October 2005.

▪ 'Women's Objectification and the Norm of Assumed Objectivity'

- Canadian Society for Women in Philosophy (C-SWIP), University of London, Ontario, Canada, October 2003.

- Eastern Society for Women in Philosophy (E-SWIP), University of Tampa, USA, April 2003.

Graduate women's studies conference, Southern Connecticut State University, USA, March 2003.

▪ 'Haslanger on Objectivity and Objectification',

Department of Philosophy, University of Sheffield, May 2002.

TEACHING

▪ 06/2010 – today

Lecturer In Philosophy

Department of Philosophy and Social Studies, University of Crete

During the academic year 2011- 2012, I am responsible for the teaching of the following courses: FIL 102 Bioethics (MA programme in Bioethics), Objectification (BA Seminar), 'Feminism' (MA seminar), 'Ethical and Bioethical Issues (BA Lecture).

- 09/2009 – 06/2010 Temporary Lecturer in Philosophy

Department of Philosophy and Social Studies, University of Crete

During the academic year 2009- 2010, I was responsible for the teaching of the following courses: FIL 101 Bioethics (MA programme in Bioethics), Feminist Ethics (BA lecture), Issues of Sexuality in Moral Philosophy (BA seminar), Solipsism and Objectification (BA seminar).

- 09/2007 – 08/2009 Lecturer

School of Philosophy, Birkbeck College, University of London

During the academic year 2007- 2009, I was responsible for the teaching of: 'Gender and Philosophy' (MA level), 'Kant' (MA level), 'Schopenhauer and Nietzsche' (BA level), 'Introduction to Philosophy' (BA Level), 'Ethics' (BA level)

- 01/2006 – 07/2007 Temporary Lecturer

Department of Philosophy, University of Sheffield

During the spring semester of 2007- 2008, I was responsible for the teaching and assessment of the course 'Moral Philosophy' in the Department of Philosophy of Sheffield University.

- 09/ 2004 – 01/2005 Teaching Fellow

Department of Philosophy, University of Sheffield

During a six-month leave of absence from my Ph.D., I was solely responsible for the teaching of the course (BA/MA level) PHI 324/6590 'Feminism: Rationality and Politics'.

- 09/ 2003 – 01/2004 Teaching Assistant
 PHI 128: Philosophy of Art and Literature (Aesthetics)
- 09/ 2002 – 01/2003 Teaching Assistant
 PHI 125: Matters of Life and Death (Ethics)
- 02/ 2004 – 06/2004 Teaching Assistant
 PHI 111: Human Rights (Political Philosophy)

Department of Philosophy, University of Sheffield

RESEARCH

- **Ph.D. Research:**

My Ph.D. thesis focuses on sexual objectification, a notion central to contemporary feminist theory, yet one that has not so far adequately been defined. As a result, it has been used rather confusingly to refer to a variety of phenomena involving, in some way or another, the vague idea of treating a human being as a thing. In my thesis, I argue that Kant has actually given us a satisfying theory of objectification, and one that has been extremely influential for contemporary feminism. After providing a detailed analysis of Kant's often-blurred ideas on sexuality, objectification, and marriage, I proceed in showing how discovering the Kantian themes in the work of contemporary feminists MacKinnon, Dworkin, and Nussbaum can prove crucial in fully comprehending their work on sexuality and objectification. Finally, drawing on both Kant's and these contemporary theorists' work, I suggest a new and more coherent understanding of the notion of objectification; one that I believe can be useful to contemporary feminism.

- **Articles:**

- **'Sexual objectification: From Kant to the feminists'**

The purpose of this article is to provide a close and careful analysis of Kant's theory of sexual objectification. It examines the process of objectification and deals with the crucial question of what it means for a person to be an object (what Kant calls an 'object of appetite'). Drawing on Kant's often-ignored discussions of prostitution and concubinage, I argue that to be an object, for him, is to be a *mere tool* for sexual purposes. The paper then examines Kant's suggested solution to the problem of sexual objectification, monogamous marriage. I finally turn to some contemporary discussions on the problem of sexual objectification, showing how influential Kant's ideas have been for feminists like MacKinnon, Dworkin and Nussbaum. My analysis of these thinkers' work is done in a Kantian light, through focusing on the striking similarities as well as the differences that exist between their views on objectification, how it is caused, and how it can be eliminated and Kant's.

**‘Women’s objectification and the norm of assumed objectivity
(A reply to Langton’s ‘Beyond a Pragmatic Critique of Reason’)**

MacKinnon has famously argued that there is a connection between objectivity and objectification. This paper examines this connection by focusing on a particular epistemic norm of objectivity, *Assumed Objectivity*, which is linked to women’s objectification. Haslanger argues that this norm should be rejected since, under conditions of gender inequality, it harms the interests of women, and yields false beliefs. Langton attempts to go beyond Haslanger’s critique, suggesting that this norm furthermore yields *true but unjustified* beliefs. I argue that the norm of Assumed Objectivity is wrongly accused by Langton in being epistemically problematic with respect to yielding true but unjustified beliefs.

‘Kantian Marriage and Beyond: Could it be worth Thinking about Kant on Sex and Marriage’

Kant has famously argued that monogamous marriage is the only relationship where sexual use can take place ‘without degrading humanity and breaking the moral laws’. Kantian marriage, however, has been the target of fierce criticisms by contemporary thinkers: it has been regarded as flawed and paradoxical, as being deeply at odds with feminism, and, at best, as plainly uninteresting. In this paper, I argue that Kantian marriage can indeed survive these criticisms. I begin with an analysis of marriage, deal with two serious problems it seems to face: that it is paradoxical and objectifying, and offer a solution to these problems. I then consider some feminist objections to Kant’s conception of marriage, and argue that it can be saved if we disentangle it from Kant’s disappointing and no longer acceptable views on gender. Finally, the paper advances the discussion beyond marriage. Drawing on Kant’s conception of friendship, I suggest that he might have overlooked the possibility of sex being morally permissible in yet another context.

‘What is Objectification?’

Objectification is a notion central to contemporary feminist theory. It has famously been associated with the work of anti-pornography feminists Catharine MacKinnon and Andrea Dworkin, and more recently with the work of Martha Nussbaum. However, objectification is a notion which has not yet been adequately defined. It has been used rather vaguely to refer to a broad range of cases involving, in some way or another, the treatment of a person (usually a woman) *as an object*. My purpose in this paper is to offer a plausible understanding of objectification. I do that by focusing on the work of four prominent thinkers: Immanuel Kant, and contemporary feminists Catharine MacKinnon, Andrea Dworkin, and Martha Nussbaum. Through drawing on these thinkers conceptions of objectification, I am finally led to a more complete and coherent understanding of this notion.

‘Pornography: Is There a Connection Between Treating Things as People and Treating People as Things?’

This paper argues against the existence of a connection between the personification of pornography (the treatment of pornography as a woman) and the objectification of women (the treatment of women as objects). I begin by explaining that there is not a *constitutive connection* between men’s personification of pornography and women’s objectification (an idea originally suggested by Catharine MacKinnon). Drawing on Melinda Vadas’ philosophical analysis of MacKinnon’s constitutive claim, argue that men’s personification of pornography does not in fact constitute women’s objectification. I then examine the possibility of a milder connection between men’s

personification of pornography and women's objectification: a *causal connection*. I argue that there is also reason to doubt the existence of such a connection. Women's objectification, as I explain, cannot be attributed to men's use of pornography as a woman.

'Bodies, Persons and Respect for Humanity: A Kantian Look at the Permissibility of Organ Commerce and Donation'

Can choosing to sale one's kidney be morally permissible? "No", Kant would answer. Humanity, whether in one's own person or that of any other, must never be treated merely as a means, but always at the same time as an end, is Kant's instruction (*Groundwork* 4: 429). He thought that organ sale violates this imperative.

... a man is not entitled to sell his limbs for money... If a man does that, he turns himself into a thing, and then anyone may treat him as they please, because he has thrown his person away... (Lectures on Ethics 27:346)

This paper explains Kant's reasons against commerce in organs, drawing on his views on prostitution, and the moral impermissibility of sexual use within this context, a case which he himself compares to the selling of one's body part(s).

Can choosing to donate one's kidney be morally permissible? If we take Kant's views at face value, it would follow that organ donation is on a par with morality *only* if it takes place in a context where people have gained rights over each other's persons (for example, in a marital context). In this context, however, a person has a *right* to her partner's kidney should she happen to need it, which can open the path to bodily violation. Moreover, this view severely restricts the permissibility of organ donation.

In this paper, I argue that a closer examination of Kant's views on what is involved in the idea of respecting humanity could reveal that organ donation does not violate the Categorical Imperative. In fact, it could be said to follow from such an imperative that we actually have a *duty* to organ donation.

ACADEMIC SERVICE

- Co-organizer, retreat 'Bioethics', October 2011, Tsoutsouros Arkalochoriou
- Co-organizer, retreat 'Bioethics', September 2010, Plakias, Rethymno
- Co-organizer, conference 'Gender, the Body, and Objectification', May 2005, Department of Philosophy, University of Sheffield. Keynote Speakers: Sally Haslanger (M. I. T.), Rae Langton (M. I. T).
- Organiser, Birkbeck Philosophy Retreat, November 2007, Cumberland Lodge, UK
- Organiser, Birkbeck Philosophy Retreat, April 2007, Cumberland Lodge, UK